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Abstract
Current methods of failed bank resolution are unnecessarily expensive
for taxpayers and impose substantial costs on borrowers at failed banks. This
situation is due to distorted incentives imbedded in the standard contract
between the government and acquirers of failed banks, which result in more
loan foreclosures than if the loan were held by a well-capitalized bank. This
paper proposes a modification to the standard contract in the form of a
transferable put, which would introduce market-based incentives to the
disposition of failed bank assets.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
or the Federal Reserve System. This proposal was first discussed with the
FDIC in November 1991.Failed Bank Resolution and the ColTateral Crunch:
The Advantages of Adopting Transferable Puts
The resolution of failed banks has received substantial public attention
because of the potential ramifications to the taxpayer and to local economies
where the government controls sizable portfolios of assets. While
considerable research has focused on bank closure policies (Benston et al.
1989, Kane 1990, and Davies and McManus 1991), and on the effects of capital
regulation on portfolio decisions of existing banks (Furlong and Keeley 1987
and 1989, Flannery 1989, and Kim and Santomero 1988), research to,date has not
deaTt with the effects of the disposition of the assets of failed banks, a
subject of increasing importance given the large number of failures.
This paper shows that current government policies regarding the
dfS!poSitiOn of failed bank assets may be unnecessarily expensive to the
taxp~e~and may also create serious credit problems in the local community.
LoanS~i~ failed banks controlled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) a~ treated much differently than they would be, had they remained in
the priVate sector. Current contracts encourage the acquirers of failed banks
to return too many loans to the FDIC. In addition, the servicing agreement
t~at the FDIC signs with the servicers of these returned loans has incentives
that encourage more frequent foreclosure than would be the case if the loans
were~ held in the portfolio of a well-capitalized bank. Many of these problems
could ~e avoided by altering procedures for the disposal of failed bank assets
to conform more closely to what would have happened if the assets had
continued to be held in banks.
Current banking problems, particularly in New England, have been
distinctive because of the rapid growth in "performing nonperforming loans,"
loans whose payments of principal and interest are current but whosecollateral value has dropped below the face value of the loan. The FDIC now
holds substantial numbers of these loans as a result of bank failures. For
example, $1.4 billion of performing nonperforming loans were transferred to
the FDIC from Bank of New England. Many of these Ioan.s are traditional
commercial loans whose security has become impaired following the significant
decline in real estate prices. In a healthy financial institution, the lender
would have an incentive to continue working with the borrower as long as the
lender had a reasonable expectation of receiving full payment eventually. In
contrast, troubled assets of failed banks are managed for the FDIC by
servicers that have neither the incentive nor the ability to work out loans in
the way that a well-capitalized bank might.
Under the current FDIC procedure, the FDIC takes all .bad assets of a
failed bank and disposes of the loans itself or through servicers hired by the
FDIC. An alternative proposed here would utilize a transferable put,~ which
could return the management of at least some o~ these loans to private banks.
For performing nonperforming loans held in "bad banks" by the FDIC, the
borrower could go to any financial institution, bringing the same government
guarantee on the loan that is extended to aquirers of failed banks.
Such a plan would have several advantages over current procedures. More
loans would be managed by the private sector, reducing assets managed by the
FDIC. Not only would this save incentive fees and expenses currently paid by
the FDIC to manage its bad asset pool, but also borrowers would have access to
lenders more willing to work out the loan. If a private market for failed
bank assets were established, banks would be more aggressive in ascertaining
borrowers’ prospects, and incentive problems found in the current servicing
arrangements would be avoided. For loans that no bank is interested inacquiring even with government guarantees, the FDIC at least has market
information on banks’ expectations for the future prospects of the borrower.
The first section of the paper describes the current procedures for
disposing of failed bank assets. The second section shows why these
procedures result in too many assets being controlled by the FDIC. The third
section shows how current servicing agreements result in too many loans being
foreclosed. The fourth section describes how disposal problems could be
reduced by providing transferable puts. The final section discusses the
advantages and disadvantages of returning to the private sector the performing
nonperforming loans in failed banks controlled by the FDIC.
I. The Disposition of Loans at Failed Banks
The overwhelming majority of bank failures are resolved through purchase
and assumption rather than the payoff of deposits. In these transactions, a
healthy bank purchases the deposits and the good loans of the failed bank,
while the FDIC retains the problem loans.
As part of the contract, the FDIC usually hires the purchaser to
collect, for a fee, on these problem loans, which are placed in the special
asset pool. The FDIC prefer~ not to collect on the problem loans itself
because it lacks sufficient staff and expertise to do it as effectively as the
private sector. Furthermore, the. FDlC cannot sell these loans to banks or
other investors, because unlike the market for ~hird World debt, a secondary
market for troubled small business loans does not exist. Presumably, the
large expense of the initial evaluation and the subsequent monitoring relative
to the size of the loan make such transactions uneconomical. The problem is
further compounded by the poor loan documentation frequently encountered atfailed banks; as a result, these loans may not meet normal underwriting
standards at most healthy banks.
The purchaser of the failed bank is given a government guarantee of the
good loans it has assumed, in the form of a put option on the FDIC. This put
option requires the FDIC to repurchase any loan that becomes classified as a
problem loan.I The loan is then added to ~he bad asset pool managed by the
purchaser. A typical put option lasts three years.2. The FDIC pays the
purchaser face value for a loan put back in the firstly.year; a 2 percent
discount from face value is taken in the second year and a 4 percent discount
in the third year, after which no more loans can be returned to the FDIC.
Several limitations are placed on the purchaser’s ability to put a loan
back to the FDIC. In particular, the purchaser loses the put if it materially
alters the terms of the loan or if it fails to return ~the loan te the FDIC
within 90 days after its becoming classified as a problem loan. Further, if
the purchaser reclaims a ~oan out of the bad asset pool, it cannot put ~the
loan back a second time. It is, therefore, in the interest of the purchaser
i Clearly, the way problem loans are classified plays a crucial part in
failed bank resolutions. Loans are classified by examiners into four categories
in the order of increasing probability of loss to the bank: other assets
especially mentioned (OAEM), substandard, doubtful, and loss. OAEMs cannot be
placed into the bad asset pool and are not covered by the put option. Only loans
classified as substandard or worse are eligible~ Substandard loans are defined
as "inadequately protected by the current sound worth and paying capacity of the
obligor or of the collateral pledge, if any..     . They are c~haracterized by the
distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some loss if the deficiencies are
not corrected "(CQmptroller’s Handbook for National Bank Examiners, March 1990,
Section 215.1).
~ The length of the put option may vary. The contracts with both Fleet
FinancialGroup for the purchase of Bank of New England and Key Bank of Western
New York for the purchase of Goldome have puts that last three years. The
contract with Chase Bank of Connecticut for the purchase of Citytrust has puts
for two years.
4to identify problem loans and turn them over to the government as quickly as
possible, in order to avoid receiving less than full face value f~om the FDICI
II. The Treatment of Nonperforming Loans
Recent bank failures have been notable for the number of loans that are
current on payments of principal and interest but classified as a result of
impaired collateral. These performing nonperforming loans often result when
small businesses take out loans to finance working capital and put up real
estate as the collateral required by banks. Although such loans ale
classified as real estate loans for reporting purposes, ~hey are used to
finance projectswhose payoffs are independent of the value of the collateral.
While a healthy bankwill carefully evaluate the unsecured part of the loan as
well as the collateral, the current FDIC servicing contracts place greater
emphasis on liquidating collateral. This difference is the focus of the model
presented in the next section.
Treatment by a Healthy Bank
Consider the following simple model of performing nonperforming loans,
which is an extension of the collateral model proposed in Chan and Kanatas
(1985). A firm borrows an amount (F) (which i~cludes principal and interest)
and posts collateral that has a value of ct. We assume that the borrower
cannot raise additional collateral after the loan has been initiated. The
borrower uses the loan to finance a project that will pay off at time T. The
payoff is uncertain and has a cumulative density function H(y). If the lender
forecloses on the project before time T, the lender will receive only the
collateral. If the lender waits until the project is completed, he will
5receive the c.ollateral ~plus any unsecured portion of the loan.
part of the 1 oan, Ut, if any is:
(I) ut= Ft-
The unsecured
The value of the unsecured debt is:
(2) V(ut) =lytdHCy~:) + u~(1- H(c~) ).
The first expression in equation (2) is the expected value if the project’s
outcome is worth less than the unsecured debt, and the second expression is
the expected value of the unsecured debt if the project’s outcome is worth
more than the unsecured debt. The sum of the two expressions is the total
value o£the unsecured debt V(u~). Note that in the case of a performing
nonperforming loan,~the value of the collateral is less than the principa7 and
interest on the loan.
If the project is foreclosed on before completion, the borrower loses
c~; if the project is completed, the borrower receives the project’s payout,
y, minus the face value of the loan plus interest. The borrower will continue
the project as long as a positive probability exists that y will exceed what
is owed on the bank loan.
If the value of the project decreases below the face value of the loan,
a healthy lender would still work with the borrower as long as equation (3) is
satisfied:
6(3) V (UT)+ CT > (C~- f) eft
The left expression is the expected value of the unsecured loan and the
collateral upon completion of the project; the right expression is the outcome
if the lender forecloses, sells the collateral with foreclosure cost, f, and
reinvests the funds until T. For loans wi.th impaired collateral, a healthy
bank is more likely to work with a borrower the greater the value of the
unsecured loan, the greater the future value of the collateral, and the
greater the foreclosure costs.
Treatment by the Acquirer of a Failed Bank
The acquirer of a failed bank could keep performing nonperforming loans
in the bank; however, the incentives in the agreement with the FDIC will cause
it to return most if not all classified loans to the FDIC. The agreement
provides that the acquirer has up to 90 days to return a classified loan ~nd
receive the full face value of the loan. Performing nonperforming loans are
still making payments of interest and principal but their value is below the
face value:
(4) V (u~) +ct < F.
Since the face value exceeds the value of the loan, the acquirer should always
return the performing nonperforming loan to the FDIC. In addition, many
acquirers of failed banks also get servicing fees for assets that are returned
to the FDIC-. This would inflate the right-hand side of equation (3),
providing ~urther incentive to return assets of the failed bank~ If the
incentives are sufficiently lucrative, the bank has an incentive to use veryconservative estimates in evaluating loans, so that the maximum number of
loans is returned.
It should also be remembered that the face value of the loan, F, is
received with certainty by the acquirer, while the loan itself has an
uncertain outcome; this would further discourage banks from retaining the loan
if they are at all risk averse. Since the full face value of the loan is
received only in the first year (with discounts to the full face value in
subsequent years), acquirers of failed banks have an incentive to class!fy
loans the first year, and to use conservative evaluations for those that may
be classified in subsequent years. Finally, any classified loan retained on
the books would require that the bank allocate scarce capital to reserve
against future losses on the loan, which could substantially increase the cost
of retaining the loan and thus depress the value of the left side of equation
(3) .~
3 The presence of a classified loan on the bank’s books increases the bank’s
required capital in two separate ways:
First, the bank is required to reserve against the possible loss by
increasing its allowance for loan and lease losses (ALL). Until the new risk-
based capital standard went into effect in 1990, the ALL account was counted as
capital for the purposes of capital adequacy. The Risk-Based Capital Guidelines
(12 CFR Parts~OB and 225) exclude ALL from Tier I capital, which consists mostly
of equity, and allow only a limited portion of it in Tier 2 capital.
Second, the presence of classified assets increases the~bank’s ove~a]l
capital requirement, regardless of the increase in ALL, because capital ratios
required bythe regulators are usually higher than the official minimum ratios.
The ratios are adjusted upwards to take account of other relevant factors, with
asset quality the most important. According to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, "In all cases, banking institutions should hold capital
commensurate with the level and nature of all of the risks, including the volume
and severity of problem loans, to which they are exposed" (August 2, 1990 Press
Release, p. 2).
8III. Treatment of Failed Bank Assets°
Once a classified loan is put back to the-FDIC, it is added to the bad
asset pool managed, for a fee, by a private collection agency, often a
subsidiary of the purchasing bank. The FDIC reimburses the collection agency
for all collecting expenses. In addition, the FDIC pays the agency an
incentive fee based on the amount it collects. The fee is on a graduated
scale based on net cumulative collections, defined as collections minus double
the collection expenses. The fee schedule is reproduced in Table I. The
Table 1
Schedule for Incentive Fees
Collections as a Percentage
of Gross Pool Value
less than or equal to 0%
over 0% to and including 20%
over 20% to and including 31%
over 31% to and including 39%
over 39% to and including 46%
over 46% to and including 50%
over 50%
Cumulative Net Incentive Fee
as a Percentage of the
Cumulative Net Collection Strata








incentive fee is capped at 5 percent of gross collections, that is,
collections from which no expenses have been subtracted. Figure I graphs the
relationship between the total (as opposed to marginal) incentive fee and the
total amount collected, assuming no collection costs. The figure shows that,
in the extreme case of no collection costs, the 5 percent cap becomes binding
after collections exceed 57.8 percent of the asset pool. The presence of
collection costs would shift the curve to the right, thus increasing the
9Figure 1
Total Incentive Fee as a Percentage of Collections
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10percentage of collections at which the 5 percent cap becomes binding. In any
case, after the cap becomes binding, the collection costs cease to matter to
the collection agency. (It will be recalled that the FDIC reimburses the
agency for all costs; the incentive fee is in addition to costs.)
The collection agency’s profit-maximizing decision, therefore, falls
into two separate cases--when the 5 percent cap is binding and when it is not.
In Case i, when the 5 percent cap is binding, the incentive fee will be given
by Equation (5).
(5) I~ = .05 * min [F,ct]
where 11 is the incentive fee,
.In Case 2, when the 5 percent cap is not binding, the incentive fee is
given by Equation (6).
(6) 12 =b * min [F,ct-2f]
where f is the cost of foreclosure, and beta is the rate of the incentive fee,
given by the slope of the graph in Figure I.
Neither the FDIC nor the servicer is in a position to provide a long-
term lending relationship with the borrower. The servicer has a fixed-term
contract with the FDIC to liquidate the portfolio. As a result, if the
horizon of the servicer is less than T, the payoff date of the loan, the
servicer will be deciding when to foreclose rather than whether to foreclose..
Thus, a critical difference between the servicer of the bad asset pool and a
healthy bank is the lending relationship. With the servicer., the banking
relationship will be severed; the only question is when. With a healthy bank,
the banking relationship will not be severed so long as the inequality inequation (3) holds. The two conditions for foreclosure of a loan by the FDIC
servicer that would not occur if it had been held by a healthy bank are
described by equations (7) and (8):
(7) (V (UT) + CT) e-r~ > (ct-f).
(8) V (ut) +ct < F.
For a loan to be foreclosed by the FDIC servicer but not by a healthy bank, it
must have a value below the face value of the loan but also have a greater
current value than the proceeds of the foreclosure, minus the costs.
The servicing contract has the most perverse incentives for loans that
are least i-mpaired. It is for these loans that the servicer has an i-ncentive
to liquidate the collateral, even though the servicer might achieve lower
costs if a longer horizon were chosen. The incentives are less perverse in
cases where the loan is nonperforming and the collateral could never pay off
the loan. For extremely troubled loans, taking possession of the collateral
may be necessary in order to prevent further deterioration of the FDIC’s
position. In such cases, maximizing the value of the asset can be achieved
only by removing the current owners through the foreclosure process.
Note that by providing incentives for the acquiring bank to put all
classified assets back.to the FDIC, all social costs Of foreclosing
prematurely on a viable business are ignored. The collecting agency receives
no benefits from maintaining a viable business, since it will not be extending
credit to the business in the future. In addition, the costs to society ~f
unemployed labor and capital are ignored in the servicing contract.IV. The Transferable Put
It is clear that thecurrent process of failed bank~resolution is biased
in favor of putting the loans back to the FDIC.~The foreclosure bias is most
damaging for the performing nonperforming loans, which have been classified
because of impaired collateral.
The transferable put feature would modify the,~ontract between the FDIC
and the failed bank purchaser in two ways. First, it would eliminate the 90-
day deadline the purchaser currently must meet in order to put a classified
loan back to ~h.e FDIC. The purchaser would be able to keep the loan on its
books for as long as it is profitable. If, subsequently, the borrower’s
condition deteriorates, for up to three years the purchaser would be able to
return the loan to the FDIC for the full face value minus the put discount.
Second, the put would ~be transferable by the borrower to a different
lender. If the purchaser of the failed bank puts the loan back to the FDICo
the borrower would be able to offer it to other banks before it is placed in
the bad asset pool. If another bank were interested, it could purchase the
loan, which would retain the same put option that was all.owed to the original
purchaser. If no other bank were interested, the loan would be placed in the
bad asset pool managed by a collection agency, as it is now.
For a classified loan to be attractive either to the original purchaser
of the failed bank or to another bank, its treatment under the capital
regulations would have to be changed, in order to prevent it from subjecting
the bank to a higher capital requirement. Such a change in treatment would be
fully consistent with existing risk-based capital requirements. Since the
loan is protected by the government guarantee, it poses no risk to the
acquiring bank, except for the 2 or 4 percent discounted portion in the second
13and third year of the put. Accordingly, the guaranteed portion of the loan
Should be .treated under the capital rules as a government obligation rather
than a loan to a private borrower.
The risk-based rules~for capital assign all assets in a bank’s portfolio
to four categories--0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and I00 percent--
corresponding to ~he percentage of the asset against which capital must be
held. All loans to private businesses are in the 100 percent category, and
capital must be held against the entire value of the asset. Government
securities backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government are
in the 0 percent category, meaning that no capital need be held against them~
Government and agency-sponsored securities not backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government are in the-20 percent category. If the bank
were to make a new loan, not only would the government guarantee for three
years not be available, but the loan would be weighted at 100 percent in
calculating capi.tal for the risk-based standards. Thus loans acquired with
puts have a substantial initial advantage for capital-constrained banks.4
In addition to being more attractive on capital grounds, the loan would
have favorable risk-return characteristics. While carrying a comDetitive
interest rate comparable to that on other loans, the loan covered by the put
is virtually risk free in the first year, with a small discount in the second
4 This argument applies only if the risk-based capital requirements are
binding on the margin. This would not be the case if the bank were constrained
by the leverage ratio instead. The leverage ratio is the ratio Of Tier 1.capital
to total (non-risk-weighted) assets. The minimum requirement is 3 percent for
banks with a CAMEL rating of I, and 4 to 5 percent for the banks with a lower
rating. For many banks, especially those with a lower CAMEL rating, the leverage
ratio results in a higher capital requirement than the risk-baSed ratio. For
banks in this position, the loan covered by the put would have no capital
advantage over a r.egular loan. It would not, however, have the disadvantage of
a higher capital requirement.
14and third year. The main advantage of the transferable put over the current
arrangement is that it would keep performing nonperforming loans out of the
bad asset pool controlled by the FDIC and in the private banking system. For
loans kept out of the bad asset pool, the FDIC not only saves the costs of
servicing the loan, it also receives the face value of the loan, rather than
the foreclosure value of the loan. Banks would be interested in loans if the
expected future value exceeds the future value of the initial outlay on the
loan:
(9) V (ut+3) +ct+3 > F (l+r)~
Loans currently classified because of slightly impaired collateral, but whose
collateral is expected to rebound because of changes in demand or a more
liquid market, would be attractive loans to retain in banks rather than in the
bad asset pool.
The FDIC may find this a less costly option, though it is not without
risks. The potential cost, C, is:
(I0) ct - d~ ct_1 +i = C,
wh6re d~ i~ I plus the discount on the put in year i. If the loan is placed
in another failed bank in the first year, the FDIC is in the same position it
would have ~een, had the transferable put not been used. In the second year
the FDIC is worse off only if the collateral value has dropped by more than
the 2 percent discount, and in the third year, by more than 4 percent. Thus,
unless the collateral is expected to drop by more than 2 percent a year, the
costs to the FDIC are zero.(1t)
The potential benefits are shown in equation (11):
F -(I+11) ct L f >-0.
The FDIC receives the face value of the loan instead of the value of the
foreclosed collateral less the servicing fee and the foreclosure costs. As
long as ~011ateral is declining by less than 2.percent a year and some loans
are retained by banks, the FDIC would be better off with a transferable put.
The FDIC is worse off only if the losses on loans whose collateral declines by
more than 2 percent a year exceed the savings on loans that are retained by
banks.
V. Conclusions
The addition of a transferable put feature to the procedures for
resolution of bank failures would confer a number of advantages. First, it
would result in cost savings for the FDIC. Mor.e loans would be retained in
the private banking system, while fewer loans would be transferred to the bad
asset pool. As a result, the FDIC would save on both the incentive fee and
the expenses paid to the collecting agency for managing the asset pool.
Even more impor~tant, making the put transferable would allow viable
businesses to avoid foreclosure and liquidation. It woul.d eliminate the
conflicting incentives now present when the purchaser of the failed bank and
the collecting agency: are pa~t of the same organization.
This analysis has assumed no uncertainty about the future price of the
collateral. In reality, banks are uncertain whether a lower spot price is a
result of a decrease in liquidity, which would leave the long-run price
unaffected, or a drop in the demand for the asset, which would decrease the
16long-run price as well. The transferable put would allow market participants
with different expectations to make economic decisions on the basis of their
beliefs. As a result, banks that believe the long-run price is unaffected
would have a chance to work out performing nonperforming loans that would
otherwise be left to the collecting agency.References
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